World
The Iran-US Agreement and the limits of American hegemony
After nearly half a century of hostility, sanctions, military threats and indirect confrontations, the announcement of a memorandum of understanding between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States may represent one of the most significant geopolitical developments in the Middle East since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in February 1979, the United States has sought to contain Iran through a variety of means. Economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, sabotage operations, hybrid warfare, targeted assassinations and the constant threat of military action have all been employed.
The objective was clear: to force the Islamic Republic to abandon its independent foreign policy, restrict its defensive capabilities and reduce its regional influence.
Forty-seven years later, the results have fallen far short of Washington’s expectations.
The memorandum now under discussion appears to reflect this new reality.
READ: Ceasefire announced between Iran and United States on all fronts
If reports published by Iranian and international media are confirmed, the agreement includes the suspension of key economic sanctions, the release of Iranian assets frozen abroad, the gradual lifting of the naval blockade and a US commitment to respect Iran’s sovereignty and refrain from interfering in its internal affairs.
This would mark a significant shift.
Perhaps the most revealing aspect of the agreement is precisely what has been excluded from the negotiations.
According to the terms reported so far, Iran’s missile programme and its support for regional resistance movements have been removed from the agenda.
This is far from a minor detail.
For years, Israel and influential sectors within the American political establishment insisted that any agreement with Tehran should include the dismantling of Iran’s deterrence capabilities and the severing of its ties with resistance movements across the region.
The exclusion of these issues suggests that negotiators have ultimately accepted what regional realities have long demonstrated: such demands were simply unattainable.
Another important element concerns Lebanon.
















